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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TROY BLONQUIST and GRACE
BLONQUIST, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
SUMMIT COUNTY, A Division of
the STATE OF UTAH; RICHARD
,;v, DURRANT, CARLOS L. PORTER; KENNETH E. WOOLSTENHULME; RONALD R. ROBINSON and BELVON BLONQUIST,
as individuals,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
11908

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF
THE CASE
The appellants appeal from a judgment of the
District Court of Summit County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge, granting the
respondents, Durrant, Porter, Woolstenhulme, Robin1

son, and Blonquist, Motion for Summary Judgment
dismissing appellants' suit against them.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On December 28, 1967, the appellants filed suit
against Summit County and individual defendants who
were commissioners and officials of Summit County
seeking judgment against them for the wilful and intentional interference with plaintiffs' road and gate.
(R. 1) Subsequently, an amended complaint was filed.
(R. 17) Thereafter the respondents filed their Answer
and a Counterclaim on behalf of Summit County. A
reply was duly filed and admissions and answers obtained. Subsequently, the individual respondents filed
a motion for summary judgment basing their motion
on the answers to respondents demand for admissions
and affidavits. Appellants filed a counter-affidavit and
on August 27, 1969, the respondents were granted summary judgment dismissing the appellants claim for
relief.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek reversal of the trial court's
order granting summary judgment and a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The instant appeal is based entirely upon the pleadings that were before the trial court. No depositions
2

or transcript of testimony is before the court. The
original complaint of the appellants alleged that there
has been a road extending through their property which
road has been maintained with a gate and lock by
the plaintiffs to restrict ingress and egress. It was
further alleged that the road was a private road and
that on or about the 12th day of July, 1967, the individual defendants tore down the gate and lock and
installed a cattle guard in the area of the fence and
opened the road to general public access. (R. 1, 2) It
was further alleged that the violation of plaintiffs'
rights by the defendants was an "intentional, wilful
and deliberate wrong* * * "An injunction was sought
and $2,500 damages. ( R. 2) Subsequently an amended
complaint was filed containing much of the same general allegations and alleging that the defendants had
received written notification of plaintiffs' interest prior
to their action of the plaintiffs claim. (R. 18-19) That,
in spite of that notification the individual defendants
removed the gate and lock and that the actions of the
defendants were intentional, wilful and deliberate and
that as a result of the actions of the defendants $2,500
actual damages was sustained. ( R. 19) $5,000 punitive
damages was also requested. (R. 19) The answer of
the defendants plead affirmatively that the Board of
County Commissioners of Summit County adopted a
Resolution to continue to maintain the road and took
affirmative steps to insure the road would be open to
the public and that the same was without the consent
of the plaintiffs. ( R. 23) They further admitted that
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the removal of the gate and lock after notice had been
given by plaintiffs to defendants of their claims that
the road was not a public road. ( R. 24) Additionally,
it was alleged that the actions of the defendants were
as officials of Summit County and were undertaken
in the capacity as county officers and that the actions
were within the discretion of the county officials.
Counterclaim was duly filed which is not relevant to
this appeal. ( R. 25, 26) A reply of the plaintiffs was
that they had exclusive right, title and interest in the
propery and that the actions of the individual defendants were an attempt to take their private property
without due process of law. (R. 33)
The evidence before the court at the time of summary judgment based on the admissions made by the
plaintiffs was that Durrant, Porter, and W oolstenhulme were Summit County Commissioners and that
Robinson was the Summit County Sheriff and that
Blonquist was an employee of Summit County acting
as the County Road Supervisor. It was further admitted
that one of the plaintiffs received a letter on the 9th
day of July, 1967 from the Summit County Attorney
advising him of the intended action to be taken by
Summit County. (R. 34, 38) This letter was given to
plaintiffs' attorney. (R. 34, 38) It was further admitted
that on the 3rd day of July, 1967, one of the plaintiffs
and others met with the Summit County Commission
in Coalville to discuss the Chalk Creek Road. The
affidavit of Porter and 'Voolstenhulme (R. 42) was
to the effect that at the hearing held on the 3rd day
4

of July, 1967, several residents of Summit County
advised the Sununit County Commission that they had
traveled on the road for an excess of ten years and had
seen county road equipment doing maintenance work.
Summit County equipment they contended had been
used to grade the road and bridges had been maintained
on the road with county funds being expended in connection with the work. ( R. 43) The affidavit further
indicated that the action of the Sununit County Commission was based upon an opinion of the Sununit
County Attorney that they had the authority to so act
It was admitted that the gate was removed and that
it had been done by Mr. Robinson and Blonquist af
the direction of the other respondents. A comparable
affidavit was filed by Blonquist and Robinson. (R. 4546) A counter-affidavit of the plaintiffs was filed indicating that the meeting of July 3, 1967 was only one
of many meetings held concerning the road and that
the plaintiffs were the owners of the road and had kept
a gate across the road and had kept the gate closed and
locked permitting only limited access and use of the
road. (R. 48) The affidavit further recited that the
public had not been allowed entry onto the road. A copy
of the Minutes of the Sununit County Conunission of
October 22, 1965 wherein the Summit County Commission had determined that they intended to take no
further action with regard to the status of the road
and that a court test would be necessary for the deterrnina tion. ( R. 48, 50) It was denied that Summit
County had spent any money for the maintenance and
5

upkeep of the road and that the maintenance was done
by the plaintiffs and that no condemnation proceedings
had been instituted by Swnmit County.

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE RESPONDENTS AGAINST THE APPELLANTS.
The appellants contend that the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment in favor of the individual respondents for the reason that the case was not
in a proper posture for summary judgment. In Kidman
v. White, 14 U.2d 142, 378 P.2d 898 ( 1963), this court
observed in reversing and remanding a case to trial
" . . . a summary judgment, which turns a
party out of court without an opportunity to
present his evidence, is a harsh measure that
should be granted only when, taking the view
most favorable to a party's claims and any proof
that might properly be adduced thereunder, he
could in no event prevail."
See also, Sams v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344
(1961). In National American Life Insurance Company v. Bayou Cowntry Club, 16 Utah 2d 417, 403 P.2d
26 ( 1965), the court observed that in order to grant
the summary judgment the case must be such to show
that
6

" ... the pleadings, depositions admissions
stipulations, together with any
proper
dence, show without dispute that the party is
entitled to prevail."
Appellants are aware of the landmark case of Dupler
v. Yates, IO Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624 ( 1960), laying
down guidelines for the granting of summary judgment when the discovery clearly reveals that the allegations contained in a party's complaint are without
merit and could not be sustained. The extensive diseovery and availability of evidence in Dupler should
be contrasted with that in the instant case. Further,
the court in Dupler observed that there was no other
evidence or counter affidavits to contradict the defendant's case. In the instant case counter affidavits were
filed and the pleadings leave issues unresolved. This
ease is therefore in approximately the same position
as the case of Hatch v. Su,,garhouse ·Pinance Company,
20 Utah 2d 156, 434 P.2d 758, where the court ruled
that where there were pleadings and counter affidavits
the case was not ripe for summary judgment since the
facts were in dispute.
The factual posture of the instant case clearly
demonstrates that there is a factual dispute and that
the case was not ripe for summary judgment treatment.
The allegations of the amended complaint show that
the respondents, members of the Summit County Commission, intentionally, wilfully and deliberately caused
a gate and lock on appellants' property to be removed
"knowina
full well that the acts they committed were
b

7

unlawful and wrong". The answer of the re.spondents
admitted the removal of the gate and lock which was
apparently accomplished by Sheriff Robinson and l\Ir.
Blonquist, but denied that the actions were wrongful
but claimed that they were done as a matter of exercise
of discretion and right. Therefore, the pleadings themselves demonstrate conflicting claims going to the question of ownership of the property and the good faith
actions of the respondents. Although the
indicate in their affidavits that they acted on the advice
of the County Attorney, their affidavits clearly reflect
that they were aware of the claims made by the appellants and that they were on notice as to the legal interest
claimed by the appellants. They had previously according to the affidavit of appellants known that the Chalk
Creek road in question was a private road and that
the matter would not be determined by the Summit
County officers but would have to await court ajudication. Therefore, a factual question exists as to whether
the actions of the commissioners were in good faith
or whether they were acting arbitrarily and wrongfully in the instant case. The nature of the advice given
by the Summit County Attorney is not clearly spelled
out. The question of the extent of evidence of public
use of the road is not meaningfully identified. A direct
dispute exists as to the maintenance of the road. All
of these facts would relate to the question of good faith
on the part of the commissioners and the sheriff and
county employee. There was therefore a factual dispute and the facts were not clearly put before the court.
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In Reliance National Life Insurance Company v. Caine,

20 Utah 2d 427, 439 P.2d 283 ( 1968), this court ruled
that where the record did not show a sufficient factual
basis to resolve the dispute that the case would be
reversed for trial de novo. The record in this case mandates a comparable action.
The inappropriateness of summary judgment in
the instant case is demonstrated when the facts of the
case are placed against the controlling case law in this
jurisdiction. In Garff v. Smith, 31 Utah 102 86 Pac.
772 ( 1906), this court ruled that where a sheep inspector acting pursuant to statute quarantined sheep
that he was acting in a quasi judicial capacity and in
the absence of malice, fraud or corruption could not
be held personally liable. In the instant case the respondents were not acting in a quasi judicial capacity,
but exercising executive authority and the issue as to
their state of mind or the propriety of the action was
clearly drawn by the facts. Appellants have no argument with the proposition that officers acting in a quasi
judicial capacity honestly exercising their prerogative
are not liable for an erroneous judgment, Salt Lake
County v. Clinton, 39 Utah 462, 117 Pac. 1075 (1911);
Logan City v. Allen, 86 Utah 371, 44 P.2d 1085 (1935},
but there is nothing in the record that would support
the conclusion that the commissioners in directing the
sheriff and county employee to destroy appellants' property were purporting to act or were acting in a quasi
judicial capacity. The trial court relied upon Board of
Education v. Jeppson, 74 Utah 576, 280 Pac. 1065
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( 1929). However, that case dealt with the abatement
of taxes and dealt with a situation where the county
treasurer acted in a quasi judicial capacity. Further
the case was not determined on smnmary judgment
but was a litigated case and the court had an opportunity to determine whether the official was acting in
good faith after full inquiry. Thus, the case is not controlling either in its legal principle or the procedural
context in which the case was decided.
A case directly in point is Roe v. Lundstrom, 89
U. 520, 57 P.2d 1128 (1936). In that case a police
officer at the direction of City Commissioners prevented
customers from entering plaintiff's place of business
because he had refused to pay a license fee required
by ordinance. The court held the police officer and the
city commissioners were liable for trespass and held
that the police officer was liable for trespass even though
he had acted in good faith. The court found the action
of the commissioners, which was comparable to the
actions taken in the instant case, constituted a trespass
and subjected them to liability. The action of this Court
was to reverse the case and remand it for trial on the
issue of liability. The liability of the police officer
was as a joint tort-feasor and the court indicated he
would be liable for trespass because of the wrongful
actions of the commissioners even if he acted in good
faith. The case of Richardson v. Capwell, 63 Utah 616,
176 Pac. 205 ( 1918) relied on by the trial court is not
apropos to the instant fact situation since there the
officer was acting pursuant to judicial proceedings and
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judicial process. No such claim can be made of the
defendants, Blonquist and Robinson, in the instant case.
lu Roe v. Lundstrom, supra, the court observed that
malice did not make the trespass any less a tort stating:
"The plaintiffs allege that Officer Smith was
actuated by malice. The defendants allege, on
the other hand, that whatever they did was done
in good faith and in the exercise of their best
judgment as officers in the enforcement of the
ordinances of Logan City. There is nothing in
the record which would tend even remotely to
justify the inference that the defendants were
actuated by malice or any improper motives. The
question of motive may be material in some
cases as where the conduct is of such a character
as to be qualifiedly privileged, or as involving
the right to recover punitive damages. It is not
as a general rule a material element to be considered in determining whether or not a legal
right has been invaded. The absence of malice or
the presence of a good motive does not render
it any the less a tort."
See also Benally v. Robinson, 14 Utah 2d 6, 376 P.2d
388 ( 1962). A case closely in point is Anderson v.
Granite School District, 17 Utah 2d 405, 413 P.2d 597.
There the court observed that where a public official
who acts in good faith believing that the actions he
takes are within the scope of his authority he cannot
be held liable for a mistake in judgment. The facts
of the Anderson case show that there was no evidence
on the part of the school district officers that they knew
of the claim of .Mr. Anderson. The defendants apparassumed that their purchase of their fee title
11

included th right to build a school building. Contrast
the instant case where
were on full notice
of the claims of the appellants and had previously
determined that court action was the best way to settle
the matter and thereafter ordered the destruction of
appellants' property. Under these circumstances a
factual case for malice or intentional wrongdoing is
clear.
This court has strongly expressed in other contexts
that self-help should be deferred to court procedure
as a means of acquiring or re-acquiring property that
one claims. Peterson v. Platt, 16 Utah 2d 330, 400
P.2d 507 ( 1965) ; Free Park Building v. Western
States Wholesale, 22 Utah 2d 266, 451 P.2d 778 (1969).
Certainly this policy is a proper adjuration for public
officials when it comes to the destruction of private
property in the absence of pressing necessity. In the
instant case no such necessity appears since the dispute
was obviously a long standing one. Access to the courts
is easy and a better alternative to the use of force.
The statutory provisions relating to county commissioners and the control and management of public
roads do not contemplate or authorize anything comparable to the action taken in the instant case. 17-5-42,
U.C.A. 1953; 17-5-38, U.C.A. 1953. Indeed the latter
section indicates that the commissioners "may institute
proceedings for acquiring such rights of way as provided by law." Although county commissioners have
a right to maintain, control, and manage public roads,
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17-5-38, U.C.A. 1953, they certainly have no right to

go on private property and remove gates and locks and
if a dispute exists as to whether a road is public or
private the matter should be settled by proper judicial
action rather than the exercise of force.
The affidavit of the respondent commissioners
merely recites that persons resident of Summit County
had advised the commission that they had traveled the
of the ten preceding
road in question for in
years. 27-12-89, U.C.A. 1953 (identical to Laws of
Utah 1886 Chapter 12, Section 2) provides a highway
shall be deemed dedicated and abandoned to the use
of the public when it has been "continuously used as a
public thoroughfare for a period of ten years." The
affidavit of the county officials does not recite continuous use nor that it had been used as a public thoroughfare. Therefore, it is insufficient to show compliance
with the mentioned statute. In construing its predecessor, this court noted in the landmark case of Morris
v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 Pac. 1127 (1916):
"Under this statute (Section 27-1-2) the highway, even though it be over privately owned
ground, will be deemed dedicated or abandoned
to the public use when the public has continuously used
as a thornughfare for a period of 10
years, but such use must be by the public. Use
under private right is not sufficient. If the
thoroughfare is laid out or used as a private way,
its use, however long, as a private way, does not
make it a public way; and the mere fact that the
public also makes use of it, without objection
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from the owner of the land, will not make it a
public way ... " (Emphasis added).
The quality of the evidence that was before the commission would be a matter of direct relevance on the
question of the good faith of their actions. If there
was merely permissive private use no claim could be
made out that the road in question was a public road.
A factual issue has definitely been created as to the
question of the good faith actions of the respondents.
To allow government officials to act with force in a
highhanded manner interfering with private property
rights is a dangerous grant of authority. Actions predicated upon claims of abuse of authority where there
are reasonable factual contentions for that abuse should
not be lightly dealt with. It was error for the court
to grant summary judgment in favor of the respondents
in the instant action.

CONCLUSION
The instant case presents a situation where the
trial court was moved to grant a hasty summary judgment. The case was not in an appropriate posture based
on the evidence before the court to where it could be
said there was no factual dispute on the issues involved.
The record clearly shows inadequate factual development and existing factual disputes on important issues.
The case involved the very serious question of the destruction and taking of private property by county offi14

cials in the face of knowledge of claims of private citizens, and the exercise of power of force rather than
judicial process. This court should reverse.
Respectfully submitted,
D. Eugene Livingston
'Villiam J. Cayias
405 Continental Bank Building

Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Appellants
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